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Response 
Authentic Reproductive Regulation 
Bridget J. Crawford† 
  INTRODUCTION   
Glenn Cohen has thrown down an intellectual gauntlet in 
Regulating Reproduction.1 This masterful article challenges 
scholars, judges and policy-makers to abandon the familiar 
“best interests of the child” argument typically made in favor of 
state interventions in reproductive decision-making in the form 
of laws prohibiting anonymous sperm donation, criminalizing 
certain adult incest, limiting access to reproductive technology, 
and funding abstinence education. In Cohen’s analysis, “best 
interests” is an uneasy import from family law where the best 
interests of an existing child guide decisions about custody, 
adoption and the like. But when transposed to laws concerning 
human reproductive practices, a best interests of the resulting 
child (BIRC) analysis provides flimsy support for state inter-
vention, in Cohen’s view. Cohen’s position, simply stated, is 
that one cannot justify restrictions on reproductive practices by 
reference to the best interests of a child who would not exist 
but for that reproductive practice. In other words, one cannot 
logically “pre-argue” that any child born of certain reproductive 
decision (about whether, when and with whom to reproduce, for 
example2) would be better off had she or he not been born. Us-
ing concepts and vocabulary from the discipline of philosophy, 
Cohen reveals deep flaws in the BIRC analysis. He considers 
seriously three variations on the BIRC argument, but demon-
strates persuasively that each is incomplete, problematic, or 
both. Glenn Cohen urges lawmakers, courts, doctors and legal 
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 1. I. Glenn Cohen, Regulating Reproduction: The Problem of Best Inter-
ests, 96 MINN. L. REV. 423 (2011). 
 2. Id. at 429. 
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commentators to “get real” (my phrase) about the reasons be-
hind reproductive interventions.  
As a legal scholar with strong interests in bioethics, health 
law and reproductive technology, Professor Cohen has a broad 
view and an authoritative voice. Regulating Reproduction will 
interest legal and other scholars who work in reproductive 
rights, constitutional law, philosophy, feminist theory, health 
law, and the adjudicatory process. This article, together with 
its companion, Beyond Best Interests (forthcoming in a future 
issue of the Minnesota Law Review)3, could change significant-
ly the content and tone of conversations about reproductive law 
and medicine. 
Professor Cohen approaches his subject with what he calls 
“a modestly libertarian view.”4 That is, he is willing to accept 
the state’s intervention in reproductive decision-making, as 
long as the state can justify doing so.5 He believes “that the 
state has to offer some justification for limiting individuals’ re-
productive choices, although [he is] open to such justifications 
taking many different forms.”6 Cohen seeks to lay bare the 
“more controversial (illiberal, eugenic, etc.) ideas”7 behind regu-
lation of reproduction. His is an “unmasking” project that aims 
to “reveal the real arguments that must stand behind these pol-
icies if they are to be justified.”8 Cohen proceeds to expose the 
BIRC argument as self-contradictory, however pervasive; he 
seeks to achieve an authentic understanding of the policies and 
normative judgments underlying reproductive interventions by 
the state. 
I.  THE WORK OF REPRODUCTION   
A. DESCRIPTIVE CLAIMS  
In a descriptive sense, Professor Cohen’s article makes two 
notable contributions to scholarship about reproductive regula-
tion. First, Cohen develops a comprehensive but elegantly brief 
taxonomy for reproductive laws and policies—what he calls 
 
 3. I. Glenn Cohen, Beyond Best Interests, 96 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2012). 
 4. Cohen, supra note 1, at 429. 
 5. Id.  
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. at 427. 
 8. Id. 
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“State attempts to influence reproduction.”9 He classifies them 
along three broad “dimensions”: target, means, and justifica-
tion.10 “Target” interventions are those aimed at influencing 
“whether, when, and with whom individuals reproduce.”11 The 
“means” of interventions range from the extreme—i.e., physical 
alteration in the form of sterilization—to the benign—i.e., in-
formation provision.12 Justifications for interventions may rely 
on theories of harm, paternalism, “wronging without harming,” 
or “moralism and virtue.”13 The labels Cohen uses for his classi-
fications—”target,” “means” and “justification”—are perhaps 
not as intuitive as they might be. The labels of “what,” “how,” 
and “why” have more a common sense appeal, but then again, 
they do not sound as refined. Professor Cohen properly locates 
BIRC in the third “dimension”; it is a “justification” (or “why” 
explanation) for state intervention in reproductive decision-
making.14  
Before laying bare the utter weakness of BIRC reasoning, 
Professor Cohen makes his second major descriptive contribu-
tion. He organizes BIRC-based legislation, court decisions, and 
legal scholarship according to the type of philosophical problem 
they raise. Interventions (and their proponents) may create 
“perfect Non-Identity Problems” or “imperfect Non-Identity 
Problems.”15 Again, Cohen’s terms are not intuitive; they have 
origins in philosophical works. Nevertheless, Cohen explains 
them well and in a way that maintains the elevated tone of the 
piece. 
Perfect Non-Identity Problems arise, Professor Cohen elab-
orates, if a particular intervention “can never be justified by re-
course to BIRC-reasoning because doing so is self-contradictory: 
the policy, if effective, will necessarily alter when, whether, and 
with whom one reproduces.”16 In other words, if a policy re-
stricts all persons from making a particular reproductive 
choice, then one cannot properly claim that the restriction is in 
the “best interests” of a child that is not conceived as a result of 
 
 9. Id. at 430. 
 10. Id. at 430–31. 
 11. Id. at 430. 
 12. Id. at 430–31. 
 13. Id. at 431. 
 14. Id. at 429. 
 15. Id. at 446. 
 16. Id. 
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such intervention.17 Thus, one cannot justify a particular re-
striction on, say, rules against brother-sister incest by reference 
to the resulting child X’s best interests.18 X only has interests to 
the extent that X is conceived, if not born, and therefore X’s in-
terests are an unstable reason to refrain from conceiving X.19 
As Professor Cohen explains, the BIRC analysis therefore must 
be revealed as an unarticulated public-interest justification if it 
is to do any real work.20 Otherwise, on its face, the BIRC justi-
fication is “nonsensical.”21 
In contrast to perfect Non-Identity Problems, an imperfect 
Non-Identity Problem arises “where state action will not neces-
sarily alter when, whether, and with whom the whole popula-
tion affected by the intervention reproduces.”22 Rather, not-
withstanding the intervention, it is possible that at least one 
person might choose to reproduce at the same time with the 
same partner in the same way that he or she would have re-
produced absent intervention.23 Thus, these interventions per-
mit the state to drastically limit—perhaps to a set of one—the 
number of children likely to be “harmed” by non-intervention.24 
Any particular intervention justification becomes more and 
more “imperfect” with the increase in the number of children 
who arguably may be “harmed” by non-intervention.25 With 
these taxonomies at hand, the reader is poised to understand 
BIRC as a smokescreen of a justification for state interventions 
into reproductive decision-making. 
B. WHAT’S SO BAD ABOUT BIRC? 
Professor Cohen insightfully highlights a cognate area of 
law where courts have rejected the BIRC analysis: so-called 
wrongful-life torts.26 A child cannot claim to have been wrong-
 
 17. See id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. See id. at 448 (arguing that BIRC-style arguments “are irrational” in 
the context of anti-incest laws because, except for cases when incest causes 
abnormalities that make life not worth living, the interest of a child who 
would never be born under a certain law cannot be used to justify that law). 
 20. See id. at 446 (noting that “[c]lassification as a ‘perfect Non-Identify 
Problem’” is dependent on “what will happen if the policy is successful”). 
 21. Id. at 458.  
 22. Id.  
 23. See id. 
 24. Id. at n.107. 
 25. Id. at 458–59. 
 26. Id. at 442–45. 
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fully conceived and born, courts reason, insofar as conception 
and birth cannot harm a child, so as long as that child has a life 
worth living.27 Wrongful birth actions, in contrast, are brought 
by parents on their own behalf, alleging that they have been 
harmed by the child’s birth.28 Courts permit these latter claims 
to proceed but disallow the former.29 The underlying theory is 
that a parent might claim to be adversely effected by a child’s 
coming into existence, but the child himself cannot be harmed 
by his own existence.30 Ipso facto, existence is not a harm to the 
person brought into existence. 
By parity of reasoning, Professor Cohen reveals BIRC justi-
fications for reproductive interventions as lacking the same log-
ical consistency missing with respect to so-called wrongful life 
torts.31 BIRC reasoning cannot be sustained, Cohen explains, 
because any child who comes into existence as a result of the 
targeted reproductive decision is, by definition, not harmed.32 
Existence is not harmful.33 As between being conceived or not 
being conceived, any child is better off having been conceived.34 
C. ALTERNATIVES TO BIRC  
1. Justifications for State Intervention 
Given the fatal flaws in the BIRC analysis, what would 
Cohen suggest in its place? He considers, but ultimately rejects, 
three theories for state intervention in reproduction. These do 
not suffer the same internal incoherence of BIRC, but Professor 
Cohen reveals them as equally flawed. First, Cohen considers 
the expansion of the “life not worth living” theory. His correct 
reading of wrongful life cases is that courts do not consider 
children with extremely severe abnormalities to have a “life not 
worth living.”35 Professor Cohen would be willing, if somewhat 
tentatively, to expand the traditional understanding of the cat-
egory to include children born with Lesch-Nyhan syndrome or 
 
 27. Id. at 444. 
 28. Id. at 443. 
 29. Id. 
 30. See id. 
 31. See id. at 442–45 (analyzing cases in which courts have rejected 
wrongful life torts). 
 32. See id.  
 33. See id. 
 34. See id. 
 35. Id. at 443–45. 
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Tay-Sachs,36 two particularly pernicious, debilitating and fatal 
diseases. But Cohen acknowledges that even this modestly ex-
panded definition of a “life not worth living” probably is not suf-
ficient to justify almost any existing reproductive interventions 
in the form of laws prohibiting anonymous sperm donation, 
criminalizing certain adult incest, limiting access to reproduc-
tive technology, or funding abstinence education.37 
A second possible justification for a state intervention—
what Professor Cohen calls “[a]llowing the perfect/imperfect 
line to do some work”38—is somewhat difficult to understand. It 
might take shape as follows: an intervention is justified if the 
likely number of children who may or may not come into exist-
ence if the intervention is in place is less than the likely num-
ber of children who may or may not come into existence if the 
intervention is not in place.39 In other words, the likely popula-
tion-wide aggregate of actual harm to actual children is lower 
with the intervention in place.40 If this reading of Professor Co-
hen’s analysis is correct, then perhaps he could be 
(mis)interpreted to justify reproductive interventions that 
cause overall fertility rates to decline. It is not entirely clear 
that this is his view, however, and this aspect of the argument 
might be developed or clarified in future work. 
A third possible justification for state intervention in re-
productive decision-making relies on what Professor Cohen 
calls “non-person-affecting principles.”41 This is the belief, in 
other words, that “the world would be better off if, instead of 
person A who will experience serious suffering or limited oppor-
tunity coming into existence, person B, who will not experience 
[those things], would come into existence.”42 The non-person-
affecting principle might be understood more easily—at least 
by the non-philosophically-trained reader—as a mandate to “do 
no harm when you could do well.”43 To illustrate, the fact that 
humans live on a planet containing more than two people justi-
fies a prohibition on first-cousin incest insofar as those wishing 
to reproduce have a choice of reproductive partners. To insist 
 
 36. Id. at 473.  
 37. Id. at 473–74. 
 38. Id. at 479–80. 
 39. See id. at 480. 
 40. See id. at 480. 
 41. Id. at 481–85. 
 42. Id. at 482. 
 43. See id. at 481–85. 
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on reproduction with one’s first cousin, for example, would be to 
“do harm” to society, when instead one has the option to “do 
well” (in a genetic sense) by reproducing with someone other 
than a first cousin. In fact, Professor Cohen reads certain pro-
hibitions on first-cousin incest, for example, as relying in fact 
on a non-specific social benefit argument, not a BIRC argu-
ment.44 Professor Cohen is more hospitable to claims that “the 
world is better off even though no person is made better off; the 
world is better in an impersonal sense”45 than he is to BIRC ar-
guments. A mandate to “do well” does not occlude its normative 
claim with an assertion of harm to a particular future child.  
2. The Particular Failure of the Non-Person Affecting 
Approach 
Professor Cohen offers three detailed reasons that the 
“non-person affecting approach”46 is a faulty theoretical ground 
for state intervention in reproduction. First, interventions that 
limit whether certain people reproduce necessarily mean that 
those people will not reproduce.47 Further limitations on with 
whom and when individuals may reproduce mean that those 
people might not, in fact, engage in reproductive activity.48 
Thus, these so-called non-person affecting interventions are not 
what he calls “same-numbers” cases; total reproduction will not 
remain constant in the presence or absence of the interven-
tion.49 Second, the non-person affecting approach is under-
inclusive. In other words, it is illogical to justify a legal prohibi-
tion on an unmarried person’s access to reproductive technolo-
gy (on the grounds that the resulting child will suffer from hav-
ing an unmarried parent), unless one also prohibits unmarried 
individuals from reproducing via traditional coitus (thus bring-
ing into existence a child having an unmarried parent).50 Third, 
Cohen reads the non-person-affecting approach to imply (at 
 
 44. Id. at 483 (“To forestall confusion, let me emphasize that the non-
person-affecting approach is not a claim that the intervention is desirable for 
the sake of that other child. He will not be harmed if he is not brought into ex-
istence.”). 
 45. Id. at 484 (emphasis in original omitted). 
 46. See id. at 481–85 (discussing the “non-person affecting approach”). 
 47. See id. at 487 (“Those policies that will produce fewer children—all the 
regulations affecting whether individuals reproduce directly have this ef-
fect . . . .”). 
 48. Id. 
 49. See id. at 489–90. 
 50. See id. at 494. 
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least potentially) that individuals have an obligation to create 
the best children they possibly can.51 If that is true, Cohen 
says, then the state should intervene to require individuals to 
engage in only “enhancing” reproduction, which he (under-
standably) finds objectionable.52 He raises concerns about the 
social messaging implications of legal interventions. For the 
state to devote resources to the prevention of certain reproduc-
tive practice, Cohen says, is to communicate to the children 
born from such practices that they are less worthy or deserving 
of life than other children.53 This, Cohen rightly decries, is too 
similar to the eugenics movement of the twentieth century and 
its associated political practices,54 moments in world history 
that all liberty-loving people should be loathe to revisit. 
II.  THE PRESENT AND FUTURE OF REPRODUCTIVE 
SCHOLARSHIP   
A. THE PRESENT: A GAUNTLET THROWN 
Throughout Regulating Reproduction, Professor Cohen 
demonstrates deep familiarity with contemporary legal schol-
arship concerning reproductive regulation. He exposes the wide 
and deep extent to which BIRC reasoning has been absorbed by 
experienced scholars. He points as an example to Naomi Cahn’s 
arguments in favor of limitations on incestuous procreation on 
the grounds of “harm to future offspring.”55 Similarly, Debora 
Spar has endorsed parental fitness examinations for would-be 
users of reproductive technology by explicit analogy to the “best 
interests” analysis used in adoption cases.56 Lynn Wardle, too, 
does not shy away from the wholesale importation of “best in-
terests” as a justification for denying access to reproductive 
technology by those she deems undesirable for one reason or 
another: single parents, lesbian or gay parents, would-be users 
of anonymous sperm donors.57 Indeed, if one were to assemble 
 
 51. See id. at 496–98. 
 52. See id. at 496–98. 
 53. Id. at 500. 
 54. See id. at 500–04. 
 55. Id. at 448 (citing Naomi Cahn, Accidental Incest: Drawing the Line—
or the Curtain?—for Reproductive Technology, 32 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 59, 
61, 86–87 (2009)). 
 56. Id. at 455 (citing Debora L. Spar, As You Like It: Exploring the Limits 
of Parental Choice in Assisted Reproduction, 27 LAW & INEQ. 481, 491 (2009)). 
 57. Id. at 454–55 (citing Lynn Wardle, Global Perspective on Procreation 
and Parentage, 35 CAP. U. L. REV. 413, 444–51 (2006)). 
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the citations in the footnotes into a single list, one would have a 
veritable “who’s who” of scholars writing about reproductive 
technology. Glenn Cohen takes on the lot, scrupulously showing 
how pervasive BIRC language is, and challenging scholars to 
leave it behind.58 
B. THE FUTURE: A GAUNTLET TO RUN 
Professor Cohen concludes Regulating Reproduction with 
an intriguing but brief sketch of possible constitutional prob-
lems with reproductive interventions by the state. He suggests, 
but does not fully explain here, that some interventions justi-
fied by reference to BIRC or alternate theories are not likely to 
pass even a “rational basis” test.59 Cohen maps out a future ar-
ticle in which he will “consider BIRC and each of its reformula-
tions under each possible tier of scrutiny.”60 In doing so, he lays 
the groundwork for a more complete challenge in the future to 
the claims of constitutional scholars like Radhika Rao61 and 
Marsha Garrison.62 Each has defended as constitutional (and 
even “desirable”) a variety of legal limitations on the use of ar-
tificial reproductive technologies.63 Cohen’s stated aim is to 
“start a conversation about the way in which the normative and 
constitutional analyses are in some places symmetrical and in 
others divergent.”64 His actual aim may be nothing short of re-
routing scholarly discussions. Professor Cohen has set up an in-
 
 58. It is in this sense that I suggest that Glenn Cohen figuratively “throws 
down” a “gauntlet,” where a gauntlet refers to a glove of medieval armor, and 
throwing down the same represents a challenge. See 6 OXFORD ENGLISH DIC-
TIONARY 404 (2d ed. 1989) gauntlet, n.1 (“A glove worn as part of medieval ar-
mour, usually made of leather, covered with plates of steel.”); id. at c. (also ex-
plaining throwing down the gauntlet “to give a challenge, from the medieval 
custom of throwing down a glove or gauntlet in challenging an opponent”). The 
word derives from the French for glove. 
 59. Cohen, supra note 1, at 514–15. 
 60. Id. at 514. 
 61. See Radhika Rao, Equal Liberty: Assisted Reproductive Technology 
and Reproductive Equality, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1457, 1460 (2008) (arguing 
that “there is no general right to use ARTs as a matter of reproductive auto-
nomy, but there may be a limited right to use ARTs as a matter of reproduc-
tive equality. ”). 
 62. See Marsha Garrison, Regulating Reproduction, 76 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1623, 1625–28 (2008) (arguing that federal courts are unlikely to adopt 
an expansive interpretation of the procreative –liberty case law). 
 63. Id. at 1625. 
 64. Cohen, supra note 1, at 517. 
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tellectual obstacle course or gauntlet65 of sorts that he intends 
to run in his future scholarship. I suspect that the course—not 
Glenn Cohen—will be worse for it. 
III.  A RIGHTS TEST   
Professor Cohen’s few minor elisions and glosses are insig-
nificant in the context of his overall argument. He dissects al-
ternatives to the BIRC justification and shores up his under-
inclusiveness critique with the assertion that that there is no 
significant difference between regulation of assisted reproduc-
tion and coital reproduction.66 He writes that “the natu-
ral/artificial line ought to carry no weight. I suspect that views 
to the contrary are the product of misfires of intuitions on posi-
tive versus negative liberty; they are misfires because both pre-
venting access to reproductive technology and preventing coital 
reproduction are negative liberty violations.”67 The reader, how-
ever, likely persists with a misfiring intuition, as it is not im-
mediately obvious that the state’s failure to fund assisted re-
production is a negative liberty violation. Such a result appears 
to obtain only to the extent that there is a constitutional right 
to become a genetic parent by any means necessary, not merely 
a generalized right to become a genetic parent. (I say “appears 
to obtain” because of the possibility that my own intuition has 
misfired completely.) In prior work, Cohen himself has puzzled 
over the articulation of a right to a genetic relationship to a 
child as either a negative right that can be violated or a posi-
tive right that requires state aid.68 He suggests that courts 
have rejected the positive right argument in other contexts.69 
Why, then, might there be a positive right to access reproduc-
tive technology? It may be that Professor Cohen has the better 
argument, but future expansion of this point would be helpful. 
In a related vein, Professor Cohen might elaborate benefi-
cially on the difference between interventions that make access 
to reproductive technology difficult, on the one hand, and inter-
 
 65. Gauntlet, as used here, derives from the Swedish gatlopp, meaning 
gata lane + lopp course. To run the gantlope (corruptly, the gauntlet) is to pass 
through a course of punishment or challenge. See THE OXFORD ENGLISH DIC-
TIONARY 405 (2d ed. 1989). 
 66. Cohen, supra note 1, at 494–95. 
 67. Id. at 495 (footnote omitted). 
 68. See I. Glenn Cohen & Daniel L. Chen, Trading-Off Reproductive 
Technology and Adoption: Does Subsidizing IVF Decrease Adoption Rates and 
Should It Matter?, 95 MINN. L. REV. 485, 524–25 (2010). 
 69. See id. 
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ventions that prevent access to reproductive technology, on the 
other. He convincingly argues that target interventions other 
than outright denial of access may operate as de facto limita-
tions on reproduction.70 But it is not clear that all when-based 
limitations, for example, rise to the level of a de facto limitation 
(and thus are unjustifiable). Again, this is not to say that Pro-
fessor Cohen is not correct in his overall conclusion, but merely 
that intermediate interventions—such as a limitation (but not 
a ban) on the use of anonymously-donated sperm—might re-
quire further scrutiny before one can adjudge them as wholly 
unjustifiable. 
IV.  A TAX TEST   
Professor Cohen’s critique of the BIRC justification is a 
lens through which one can examine a variety of points of state 
intervention into reproductive decision-making. Consider, for 
example, the potential application of Cohen’s analytic frame-
work to the income tax treatment of amounts received by a 
woman for acting as a gestational surrogate. There is wide-
spread agreement among legal commentators that compensa-
tion received by a woman for carrying and bearing a child is 
taxable income.71 This is true even though some surrogacy con-
tracts specifically recite that any receipts are to reimburse the 
surrogate for “living expenses,” “food,” or “clothes.”72 Surrogates 
themselves may refer to the receipts as compensation for the 
“needles, sticks, stretch marks and pain/suffering” associated 
with pregnancy.73 Nevertheless, there is no income tax law that 
would exclude from gross income amounts received for acting 
as a surrogate. 
 
 70. Cohen, supra note 1, at 478–81. 
 71. See Lisa Milot, What Are We - Laborers, Factories, or Spare Parts? The 
Tax Treatment of Transfers of Human Body Materials, 67 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1053, 1103 (2010); Jay A. Soled, The Sale of Donors’ Eggs: A Case Study 
of Why Congress Must Modify the Capital Asset Definition, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 919, 949–50 (1999); Note, Tax Consequences of Transfers of Bodily Parts, 
73 COLUM. L. REV. 842, 853–54 (1973); James Edward Maule, Federal Tax 
Consequences of Surrogate Motherhood, TAXES: THE TAX MAGAZINE, Sept. 
1982, at 657 (“Unquestionably, the fee paid to a surrogate mother . . . is gross 
income to the surrogate mother.”). 
 72. See, e.g., BRIDGET J. CRAWFORD, Taxing Surrogacy, in CHALLENGING 
GENDER INEQUALITY IN TAX POLICYMAKING 95, 97 (Kimberley Brooks et al. 
eds., 2011) (citing interview with Joseph X). 
 73. George Saenz, Tax Talk, BANKRATE (May 24, 2005), http://www 
.bankrate.com/brm/itax/tax_adviser/20050524a1.asp. 
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For as clear as tax commentators are on the income tax 
consequences of surrogacy, agencies and surrogates themselves 
are unclear. Surrogacy agencies do not provide consistent or ac-
curate guidance to surrogates. One internet discussion group 
for surrogates mentioned 18 surrogacy agencies.74 Only six of 
those agencies reportedly issue a Form 1099-MISC to surro-
gates.75 Twelve of those agencies reportedly do not.76  
Given the conflicting information—or utter absence of in-
formation—from surrogacy agencies (who are repeat market-
players that should be aware of the proper tax treatment of 
amounts paid to surrogates), it is not surprising that surro-
gates themselves appear confused about their income tax obli-
gations. It is difficult to know for sure how many surrogates re-
port and pay tax on amounts they receive for gestating and 
giving birth to a child. The United States Income Tax Return 
(Form 1040) does not specifically ask whether the taxpayer has 
received payments for carrying a child. No government agency 
collects this information. Thus, one must turn to the words of 
the surrogates themselves for anecdotal evidence. On the same 
online bulletin board that reported the practices of 18 agencies, 
the suggestion that agencies should issue to surrogates a Form 
1099 for amounts paid “for services performed for a trade or 
business by people not treated as its employees” or “rent or 
royalty payments” provoked a strong reaction in the surrogate 
community. One surrogate wrote in response: “I believe that 
most of the places that do 1099 think of us as ‘independent con-
tractors’ of which we are NOT!”77 But another surrogate asked 
an online financial adviser: ‘I served as a surrogate carrier in 
2004 and gave birth earlier this year. . . . Do I have to report 
my compensation? . . . I do feel I shouldn’t have to pay taxes for 
being compensated for helping a couple to have a baby.”78 As a 
matter of law, however, the United States income tax rules do 
not make room for the subjective feelings of the taxpayer. Com-
pensation for services is taxable.79 
 
 74. SusanFrmLA, Posting to What Agency or Attorney gives out 
1099s?, SURROGATE MOTHERS ONLINE MESSAGE BOARDS ( last updated Dec. 
29, 2008, 4:52PM), http://www.surromomsonline.com/support/showthread 
.php?p=1604396. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Saenz, supra note 73. 
 79. See I.R.C. § 61(a)(1). 
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Regardless of the legal “correctness” of treating paid surro-
gacy receipts as income, one can imagine (at least) two meta-
objections to such a tax. First, openly acknowledging the taxa-
bility of surrogacy receipts impinges on the narrative of altru-
ism that pervades the fertility industry.80 An income tax liabil-
ity for surrogacy is in direct conflict with the self-conception of 
surrogates—encouraged by fertility brokers—that surrogacy is 
a “gift” that a woman can give to a childless family.81 Ac-
ceptance of a tax on surrogacy is to accept reproductive work as 
a type of paid labor. Second, one can imagine the objection that 
the introduction of taxation to an already-fraught transaction 
(or “relationship,” if one prefers) makes surrogacy too much like 
baby-selling to be comfortable for many people. In another con-
text, Martha Ertman has asked whether “purchasing gametes 
to conceive a child could cause the child to feel that he or she 
has been purchased like a new car.”82 Extending that same rea-
soning, one presumably might object to taxing surrogacy on the 
grounds that the incidence could cause the child to feel that he 
or she has been “grown” by a surrogate as a hired hand may 
grow flowers in an owner’s garden.83 The anti-commodification 
impulse is strong among even those who support liberal access 
to reproductive technology, and so this argument is to be antic-
ipated.84 
 
 80. See, e.g., Kimberly D. Krawiec, A Woman’s Worth, 88 N.C. L. REV. 
1739, 1757–60 (2010) (“[F]ertility-center and donor-agency screening practic-
es . . . eliminate as unacceptable potential egg donors who claim monetary 
compensation as the overriding motivation for egg donation.”). 
 81. See id. at 1758 (“In addition to normalizing what is otherwise a jarring 
dichotomy . . . there is an obvious appeal to believing that one’s selfless behav-
ior helps another.”). 
 82. Martha M. Ertman, What’s Wrong With A Parenthood Market?: A New 
and Improved Theory of Commodification, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1, 33 (2003). 
 83. Surrogates are often unaware of the correct tax treatment of surroga-
cy payments and most legal scholars ignore this question entirely. Cf. Bridget 
J. Crawford, Taxation, Pregnancy and Privacy, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & 
L. 327, 346 (2010) (“not all surrogates understand that their receipts are taxa-
ble income.”); Crawford, Taxing Surrogacy, supra note 72, at 99–100 (quoting 
surrogates asking tax related questions); Maule, supra note 71, (examining tax 
consequences of surrogate mother and childless couple); Milot, supra note 71, 
at 1080–82 (reviewing limited or outdated academic work relating to surroga-
cy taxation); Soled, supra note 71. See, e.g., Crawford, Taxing Surrogacy, su-
pra note 72, at 104–05 (discussing social and cultural implications of surroga-
cy taxation). 
 84. In the forthcoming companion article to Regulating Reproduction, su-
pra note 1, Professor Cohen assesses the anti-commodification arguments as 
not raising a Non-Identity Problem as long as the harm asserted is to the par-
ents of such “commodified child” or to society at large. See Cohen, supra note 3. 
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Professor Cohen’s critique of BIRC provides an entry point 
for evaluating the argument that taxing surrogacy makes it too 
commercial (and thus harmful to a resulting child’s self-
perception). A child cannot be said to be harmed by its own ex-
istence, as Cohen has explained.85 Thus, the means by which a 
child is conceived, gestated, and born—and whether any money 
changes hands—should be irrelevant. In this way, the anti-tax 
argument suffers from the same Non-Identity Problem as do 
objections of Martha Ertman and Peggy Radin, among others, 
to compensated surrogacy (without regard to tax questions).86 
Might an anti-tax argument also raise a further Non-
Identity Problem? One can speculate about the economic and 
behavioral effects of a clearly-expressed government statement 
that amounts received under a surrogacy contract would be 
treated as taxable income.87 It may be that the prices for surro-
gacy services would go up and/or that the number of available 
surrogates would decline.88 Therefore, at least in the latter 
case, the tax would operate as what Cohen calls a “de facto re-
striction on whether individuals can reproduce at all.”89 Thus 
Professor Cohen’s analysis illuminates that the anti-tax argu-
ment raises an imperfect Non-Identity Problem.90 That is not to 
say that a tax could not be justified on other grounds.91 It is on-
ly to say that BIRC is not a robust enough justification for op-
posing such a tax.92 
 
 85. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
 86. See generally Cohen, supra note 1, at 467–77 (discussing how surroga-
cy compensation is in the best interest of the child). . 
 87. See Crawford, supra note 72, at 100–02. 
 88. Id. at 103. 
 89. Cohen, supra note 1, at 468. 
 90. See id. (“[S]o long as that population of altruistic egg/sperm donors 
and surrogates is different from the population of compensated ones (with 
whom) or conception occurs at a different time (when), the ban on compensa-
tion cannot be said to be in the best interests of this child—the one who would 
exist in commercialized regime but does not in a one that makes compensation 
unlawful.”). 
 91. One alternate justification might ground in economic distortion con-
cerns. See Crawford, Taxing Surrogacy, supra note 72, at 100–03. The failure 
to tax surrogacy arrangements causes surrogacy to become, in effect, a subsi-
dized form of labor. Id. at 100–05.  
 92. Cf. Frances Woolley, When is a Ban a Subsidy?, WORTHWHILE 
CANADIAN INITIATIVE (Feb. 18, 2011), http://worthwhile.typepad.com/ 
worthwhile_ canadian _initi/2011/02/when-is-a-ban-a-subsidy.html (discussing 
problems with subsidizing surrogacy using tax policy). 
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  CONCLUSION   
The contributions of Regulating Reproduction are consid-
erable. Those who criticize legal scholarship for its lack of rele-
vance to the practice of law93 might be quick to point to Cohen’s 
terminology—perfect versus imperfect, Non-Identity, non-
person-affecting—as evidence of the work’s inaccessibility. But 
Professor Cohen imports philosophical terms and reasoning in 
the service of revealing foundational weaknesses in contempo-
rary legal thought—weaknesses that are shared by commenta-
tors, lawmakers, and judges. Through original taxonomy and a 
dauntless attention to foundational principles, Glenn Cohen 
has elevated the discourse about reproductive law and policy.  
 
 93. See, e.g., Jess Bravin, Chief Justice Roberts on Obama, Justice Ste-
vens, Law Reviews, More, WSJ BLOGS (Apr. 7, 2010, 7:20 PM), http://blogs.wsj 
.com/law/2010/04/07/chief-justice-roberts-on-obama-justice-stevens-law-reviews 
-more/ (“Roberts said he doesn’t pay much attention to academic legal writing. 
Law review articles are ‘more abstract’ than practical, and aren’t ‘particularly 
helpful for practitioners and judges.’”); Law Prof. Ifill Challenges Chief Justice 
Roberts’ Take on Academic Scholarship, ACSBLOG (July 5, 2011), http://www 
.acslaw.org/acsblog/law-prof-ifill-challenges-chief-justice-roberts’-take-on-academic 
-scholarship (“If the academy wants to deal with the legal issues at a particu-
larly abstract, philosophical level . . . that’s great and that’s their business, but 
they shouldn’t expect that it would be of any particular help or even interest to 
the members of the practice of the bar or judges.” (quoting Chief Justice Rob-
erts)). 
